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Abstract
This Article reviews the Uruguay Round Agreements and examines the implications of this
new multilateral trading system on U.S. sovereignty. Specifically, this Article reviews the new
dispute settlement process and the relevant U.S. legislation. Part I provides an overview of the
Uruguay Round Agreements. It reviews the Agreement Establishing the WTO and the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Part II provides an
overview of the U.S. implementing legislation. Part III reviews the proposed Dispute Settlement
Review Commission. Part IV examines the implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements on
U.S. sovereignty. Specifically, it analyzes the impact of the dispute settlement process on both
federal and state law.
THE CHANGING FACE OF PEACE-KEEPING
AND PEACE-ENFORCEMENT*
Shashi Tharoor**
In the second half of 1995, our newspaper headlines and
television screens have borne eloquent testimony to the chang-
ing face of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. Earlier this
summer, United Nations peace-keepers' were pushed aside as
Bosnian Serbs took the "safe areas" of Srebrenica and Zepa, and
again as Croatian forces overran the former "United Nations
Protected Area" of the Krajina. Peace-keepers were taken hos-
tage or forced to stand by in frustrated impotence as atrocities
and human rights abuses were committed barely out of earshot.
Then, and almost in another dimension, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization 2 ("NATO"), with the endorsement of the
Secretary General of the United Nations ("U.N."), conducted
wide-ranging and disproportionate air strikes against Bosnian
Serb military forces threatening Sarajevo and the remaining safe
areas.3 Two sets of powerful images - one reflective of the limi-
tations of international peace-keeping in situations where there
is no peace to keep, the other seemingly demonstrating the po-
* This essay is based on a presentation on the same topic made by the author to
the Annual Conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in Vienna on
September 9, 1995. A revised text, under the title "Should Peacekeeping Go 'Back to
Basics'?" appears in SuRvIVAL, Vol. 37, No. 4, Winter 1995-96. Parts of this essay, in
somewhat different form, also appear in chapters contributed by the author to the
books, AFrER RWANDA: THE COORINATION OF UN Hu I'rrARuA ASSISTANCE (Jim
Whitman, ed., Macmillan, London 1995) and FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE-MAMNG
(Bo Huldt, ed., Swedish War College, Stockholm 1995).
** Special Assistant to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-
Keeping Operations. The views expressed in his essay are, however, personal and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. Shashi Tharoor is the author of
THE GREAT INDIAN NOVEL and other works of fiction and scholarship.
1. Throughout this essay, "peace-keepers" will refer to peace-keeping forces oper-
ating under the auspices of the United Nations.
2. See NATO INFORMATION SERVICE, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION,
FACTS AND FIGURES 13-14 (1989). The North Atlantic Treaty Organiztion ("NATO") was
formed on April 4, 1949 by ten European countries, the United States, and Canada, in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Id. at 3; see U.N. CHARTER
art. 51 ("Nothing in thee present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations .... ").
3. Other safe areas include Bihac, Goradze, and Tuzla.
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tential of the use of force to promote peace in the same situation
- frame the context of this discussion.
This paradox describes the heart of the dilemma facing
those of us who work in peace-keeping. Early in 1995, the New
York Times turned its magisterial gaze upon the future of U.N.
peace-keeping, an activity that had earlier received considerable
criticism in its editorial columns, particularly with respect to Bos-
nia and Somalia. "Rethinking and retrenchment are in or-
der.... There should be a shift back toward more limited objec-
tives like policing cease-fires," it declared.4 "UN peace-keeping
does what it can do very well. It makes no sense to continue
eroding its credibility by asking it to do what it cannot."5
This somewhat startling advocacy of a return to traditional
verities gave pause to many of us who had been engaged in the
practice of peace-keeping during its recent tumultuous history.
Was the New York Times right, and if so, were we to contemplate a
future of retreating headlong into the past?
At one level, there is something oddly comforting about the
thought of seeking safety in well-worn practices; resting on old
laurels is a good deal easier than wresting new ones. "Tradi-
tional peace-keeping" is indeed something the United Nations
has done well and continues to know how to do. Our least prob-
lematic operations are always those where the parties agree to
end their conflicts and only need our help to keep their word;
where the consent and co-operation of the parties can be as-
sumed and the impartiality of the peace-keepers is unchal-
lenged; where the risks are low, the use of force largely unneces-
sary, and the tasks assigned to the peace-keepers are those that
are basic bread-and-butter skills for any army in the world; and
where the limited resources available to the United Nations are
adequate for the job at hand.'
In these situations, the United Nations can bring a wealth of
experience and precedent to bear in the successful conduct of
such peace-keeping operations. Many of us in this business
would like nothing more than to say: "give us the buffer zones in
4. The Future of U.N. Peacekeeping, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at A24 [hereinafter Fu-
ture of UN Peacekeeping].
5. Id.
6. While this is not a formal definition of "traditional peace-keeping," it summa-
rizes all the elements that have gone into the making, and successful working, of that
concept.
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Cyprus or Kuwait, the elections in Cambodia or Mozambique,
the package-deals in Namibia or El Salvador, and we'll deliver
you an effective, efficient success-story, on time and under
budget." All professionals - and U.N. peace-keepers are no ex-
ception - are always happy to be asked to do what they can do
best.
Sadly, however, this attractive formula has one thing wrong
with it: it's a good answer, but only to part of the question.
Traditional peace-keeping is all very well if the only crises con-
fronting the United Nations are those that are ripe for the
peace-keeping treatment. But classical, consensual peace-keep-
ing does not respond fully to the nature of the world we live in
and the challenges the new world disorder poses to the interna-
tional community.7 If the nature of U.N. peace-keeping has ac-
quired a certain elasticity in recent years, it is precisely because
circumstances have led the international community to make de-
mands on the military capacity of the United Nations that vastly
exceed anything it was called upon to do as recently as three or
four years ago. We will not be able to face the twenty-first cen-
tury by remaining firmly rooted in the twentieth.
At the same time, there is no question that the heady days of
peace-keeping overreach are over. Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali recently declared that, "the number of U.N. oper-
ations, the scale of the operations, the money spent on opera-
tions cannot keep growing indefinitely. The limits are being
reached."8 At the end of the Cold War, an unprecedented de-
gree of agreement within the Security Council in response to
international crises plunged the United Nations into a dizzying
series of peace-keeping operations that bore little or no resem-
blance in size, complexity, or function to those that had borne
the peace-keeping label in the past. For years during the Cold
War, peace-keeping had worked well, within the limitations im-
posed upon it by superpower contention - well enough, at any
7. For analyses of these contemporary challenges, see JAMEs N. ROSENAU, TURBU-
LENCE IN WORLD POLInCs: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND CONTINUITY' (1990); Lawrence
Freedman, Order and Disorder in the New World, FOR. AFF.: AMERICA AND THE WORLD, 71,
No. 1 (1991-92), at 20-37; Thomas G. Weiss, UN Responses in the Former Yugoslavia: Moral
and Operational Choices, 8 ETHICS AND INT'L AFF. 13-14 (1994); Ethnic Conflict and Interna-
tional Security, SURVIVAL (Special Issue), Spring 1993, at 35.
8. United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Managing the Peace-
Keeping Challenge, Address at Yale University (Mar. 21, 1995) (transcript available from
U.N. Department of Public Information, Press Release SG/SM/5589).
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rate, to win the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize. Then, when these limi-
tations evaporated, everything seemed possible. At the same
time, the new transcendence of the global media added a sense
of urgency to these crises: it is a striking coincidence that the
reach and impact of Cable News Network ("CNN") and its imita-
tors peaked precisely at this time of post-Cold War concordance.
Television showed that action was needed, and the end of the
Cold War meant that action was possible. So "peace-keeping"
became a catch-all term covering not merely the monitoring and
implementation of cease-fire agreements, but an entire range of
tasks including supervising and running elections, upholding
human rights, overseeing land reform, delivering humanitarian
aid under fire, rebuilding failed states, and, as the New York Times
put it in the same editorial, "ambitious attempts to impose peace
on hostile forces determined to keep fighting."9 The widespread
criticism, not all of it well-founded or fair, of U.N. efforts in situa-
tions where there was little peace to keep - particularly in
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda - lie directly be-
hind the calls for retreat to a simpler era. Amidst so many voices
urging the United Nations to go "back to basics," it is clear that it
will be a long time before the Security Council again authorizes
another of the lhybrid operations whose ever-mounting scope
spiralled seemingly out of control in a flurry of Council resolu-
tions in 1992 and 1993.
But this should not mean a return to the brave old world of
buffer zones and policing cease-fires, the non-threatening appli-
cation of military skills to defuse conflicts. The irony of the
"back to basics" appeal is that the United Nations had already
moved successfully beyond the basics before getting embroiled
in the controversies of recent years. The operations that
brought Namibia to independence, transformed the societies
and politics of Cambodia and El Salvador, and restored hope in
Mozambique were all multi-dimensional efforts that demon-
strated the effectiveness of a broader concept of peace-keeping
- one that combined military functions with a variety of largely
civilian undertakings to bring about change and fulfill the objec-
tives of the operation. The techniques involved have proved
their effectiveness and, therefore, should not be jettisoned. In
admitting, understandably, that the United Nations cannot af-
9. See Future of UN Peacekeeping, 'supra note 4, at A24.
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ford to become part of the problem as it did by taking sides in
Somalia; in acknowledging that the United Nations cannot easily
find troop-contributing countries willing to commit forces to
halt genocide, as it had hoped it might in Rwanda; in accepting
that the United Nations can protect humanitarian aid deliveries,
but that it cannot force them through, as we have discovered in
Bosnia; in conceding all this, the United Nations need not aban-
don the functions of policing the local police, of sheltering vul-
nerable groups, of upholding human rights standards, of run-
ning free and fair elections, of supervising mistrusted local ad-
ministrations, and of creating conditions conducive to political
accommodation and national reconciliation, all of which it has
done in recent years with success - and all of which take us
beyond the New York Times prescription with which I began this
essay.
Yet, that too is only a partial answer to the questions that
confront us today. For "multi-dimensional peace-keeping" still
rests on the traditional pillars of agreement and consent. The
new functions identified above are usually reflected in the terms
of a comprehensive settlement that both, or all, parties to a con-
flict wish the United Nations to implement, and none of them
involve a threat to the United Nations' preference for the non-
use of force. We can move beyond traditional peace-keeping and
still find ourselves on familiar ground. The more difficult
problems relate to situations in which agreements are non-exis-
tent or short-lived, where the United Nations does not enjoy the
formal consent or the practical co-operation of the parties
amidst whom it is deployed, and when the nature of the ongoing
conflict obliges us to confront searching questions about the
need to use force in order to be effective, with the concomitant
risk that doing so will jeopardize the United Nations' impartiality
and thus the very effectiveness it is trying to attain.
The thawing of the Cold War has created an environment in
which the world will be making choices about the management
of international conflicts. The eclipse of the Communist bloc
loosened the straigacket within which many potential conflicts
had been confined. Many conflicts erupted amid the disinclina-
tion of the big powers to intervene; during the Cold War, both
superpowers sought to prevent conflicts arising which might en-
gage their interests. Today, the stakes are lower; Somalia is not
seen as threatening to lead to another Stalingrad and Sarajevo
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1992, for all its emotional impact, does not carry the globe-
threatening resonance of Sarajevo 1914. In this climate, warring
factions, unfettered by bondage to one superpower or another,
pursue their ambitions without regard to an outside world that
clearly cannot summon the will or the resources to intercede de-
cisively. A post-ideological world stokes its frenzies in the flames
of nationalism, ethnicity, and tribal triumphalism. Old injustices
and older enmities are revived and intensified; history becomes
a whip with which to flail those who are inclined to compromise.
Few rules are observed in these wars, fewer still in the tenuous
moments of peace that punctuate them. The techniques of a
calmer era, peace-keeping included, seem inadequate to the mo-
ment.
Yet abstention is not really an option. For most of the crises
that thrust themselves on the United Nations' agenda, indiffer-
ence is impossible. This is not just a moral matter, though the
suffering caused by these conflicts - in many of which the in-
fliction of agony on innocent civilians is a direct aim, rather than
a by-product, of war - remains an affront to the world's con-
science. In a world of instant satellite communications, with tel-
evision images of suffering broadcast as they occur, few demo-
cratic governments are immune to the public clamor to "do
something." For a couple of years, the international community,
pressed to respond and unready with an alternative international
security mechanism, found in U.N. peace-keeping the "some-
thing" it could "do." Peacekeepers took unprecedented risks,
made foreseeable mistakes, and suffered an intolerable level of
casualties. Governments, accountable politically for the safety of
their soldiers, cut their losses and proved unwilling to risk addi-
tional ones. In the process, we have all learned what peace-keep-
ing cannot do and, yet, we cannot afford to do nothing. The
challenge of the future is to define that "something" in terms of
what is doable - in other words, to identify how the United
Nations can be enabled to respond to future Somalias and
Rwandas while retaining the support of Member States.
It is in this context that we have again begun to hear about
"peace-enforcement," which had fallen out of fashion after the
disasters of Somalia. In 1995, with the overt threat of massive air
force being used to control the conflict in Bosnia, peace-enforce-
ment has again acquired cachet and credibility. Conceptually,
this troubles me.
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The ongoing work taking place in a number of defense min-
istries around the world, as well as at U.N. Headquarters, to de-
fine the terms under which peace-keeping operates represents
one of the most vital developments for the future of peace-keep-
ing. For the evolution of peace-keeping in the new world disor-
der has outstripped the conceptual underpinnings that girded it
during the Cold War years. U.N. peace-keepers have intervened
in crises before the world could find the time to elaborate, or
agree upon, the doctrinal justifications or the overall strategy be-
hind each new mandate (or modification of mandate).
Peace-keeping was an activity that the United Nations had
always been politically reluctant to define. The intergovernmen-
tal Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, for in-
stance, annually discussed a declaration on the principles of
peace-keeping and annu'ally rejected the idea on the grounds
that to define peace-keeping was to impose a strait-jacket on a
concept whose flexibility made it the most pragmatic instrument
at the disposal of the world organization. Nonetheless, a consis-
tent body of practice and doctrine evolved over the years: peace-
keepers functioned under the command and control of the Sec-
retary-General; they represented moral authority rather than the
force of arms; they reflected the universality of the United Na-
tions in their composition; they were deployed with the consent
and co-operation of the parties; they were impartial and func-
tioned without prejudice to the rights and aspirations of any
side; they did not use force or the threat of force except in self-
defence; they took few risks and suffered a minimal number of
casualties; and they did not seek to impose their will on any of
the parties. As the Security Council proclaimed "no-fly zones"
and "safe areas," declared punitive actions against warlords, and
acquiesced in NATO-declared "exclusion zones"; as Member
States established command arrangements that did not in all
cases terminate in New York; as peace-keepers mounted anti-
sniping patrols and called in air strikes, all these principles be-
came strained to the breaking-point.
Until the NATO air strikes of September 1995, there was
general recognition that peace-keeping is not peace-enforce-
ment and that the two activities do not mix very well. In other
words, enforcement action proceeds from different premises
and is not merely one more stage in a "peace-keeping contin-
uum." As the Secretary-General put it:
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The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military
premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement;
and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the
political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate.
To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the
viability of the peace-keeping operation and endanger its per-
sonnel. 10
Both the new British doctrine of "Wider Peace-keeping" and
the U.S. Army Field Manual on the subject identify consent as
the crucial ingredient in peace-keeping. This is a welcome de-
velopment. It is to be hoped that the continuing process of re-
flection and analysis on this question will result in a consensus
amongst Member States on what peace-keeping is and what it is
not. The dangers of conceptual confusion for soldiers in the
field, and for the credibility of the United Nations itself, clearly
outweigh the short-term advantages that doctrinal elasticity
might provide governments. But doctrines and field manuals
are one thing and decisions taken by governments under polit-
ical compulsion are something else. The very same governments
that have worked on these concepts have also led the NATO
drive to conduct air action against one party in Bosnia while leav-
ing the peace-keepers on the ground.
Conceptual clarity has, of course, been particularly elusive
on the Bosnia question. The U.N. peace-keeping effort in Bos-
nia has been a curious amalgam of functions ranging from the
purely humanitarian to the imposition of rules and restraints on
the belligerents, what I have elsewhere called "conflict-mitiga-
tion." 11 The same soldiers on the ground have been expected,
under eighty-seven Security Council resolutions and another
eighty-seven Presidential Statements of the Council (as of mid-
December 1995), to perform functions that have required the
daily, ongoing co-operation of all parties, while limiting their re-
course to certain military means (maintaining an interdiction on
the use of aircraft for combat purposes) or to attacks upon cer-
tain towns (the so-called "safe areas"). The international com-
munity, in order to enforce a partial peace in an unresolved con-
flict, has now carried out air strikes against a party without whose
10. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-Genera at 9, 35, U.N.
Doc. S/1995/1/A/50/60 (1995).
11. See Shashi Tharoor, United Nations Peacekeeping in Europe, SURVIVAL, Summer
1995, at 122.
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consent and co-operation U.N. soldiers could not function,
move, or be resupplied.
Earlier this year, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali declared,
"if there is no political will among the protagonists to solve the
problem, the United Nations cannot impose peace."' 2 This firm
statement of principle was necessary because, in the heady days
after the end of the Cold War, its somewhat obvious truth had
eluded too many. The United Nations' experiences in Somalia
and the former Yugoslavia - despite the hopes raised by the
recent NATO air strikes - have made it clear that those who are
determined to fight cannot be prevented from doing so by U.N.
peace-keepers. People who are convinced they have more to
gain on the battlefield than at the negotiating table are also par-
ticularly unreliable partners for the U.N. peace efforts. In any
case, as the Secretary-General went on to point out in the same
speech, the imposition of peace requires military, financial, and
political resources that Member States are simply not willing to
provide for operations other than war, and these resources re-
quire a capacity to manage them which the United Nations Sec-
retariat does not possess and is unlikely to be granted.'"
Nor is it wise to extrapolate too generously from the special
case of Bosnia, where major governments have so much at stake
that they have been tempted to abandon the restraints that con-
fine them elsewhere. The conditions imposed by the Security
Council on the deployment of U.N. troops into Angola, earlier
this year, are more typical of the attitude of the international
community today. The Security Council instructed the Secre-
tary-General not to deploy the troops it had authorized for the
U.N. Angola Verification Mission 14 ("UNAVEM I") peace-keep-
ing operation until the Angolan parties had revealed a tangible
commitment to peace and to honoring their undertakings to
each other under their peace agreement - conditions which, if
applied to the former Yugoslavia, would have ended any U.N.
deployment there. The conclusion is inescapable: the world
would rather have allowed war in Angola to continue than have
12. United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Speech to Twenty-
Fifth Vienna Seminar 4 (Mar. 2, 1995) (Press Release SG/SM/5572; PKO/39) [herein-
after Vienna Seminar Speech].
13. Id.
14. United Nations Angola Verification Mission I, S.C. Res. 626, U.N. SCOR, 43rd
Sess., 2834th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/626 (1988).
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borne the costs of imposing peace on the recalcitrants. NATO's
actions in Bosnia are an exception, one unlikely to be repeated
elsewhere.
Can the United Nations expect to mix peace-keeping and
coercion, as the Security Council has obliged it to do in Somalia
and now in Bosnia and Herzegovina? The United Nations Oper-
ation in Somalia's'" ("UNOSOM") attempts to impose peace led
to the loss of political support and its eventual withdrawal from
Somalia; the United Nations Protection Force16 ("UNPROFOR")
has been blamed for failing to do things it was never mandated,
staffed, financed, equipped, or deployed to do. Public opinion
and political rhetoric have tended to outstrip both the mandate
and means given to the United Nations. Most of UNPROFOR's
critics, for instance, seem to think that UNPROFOR ought to be
resisting or repelling "aggression." But the answer to aggression
is not a peace-keeping operation; it is Operation Desert Storm. 1 7
In responding to the complex origins of the Yugoslav tragedy,
the Security Council chose not to take military sides in the con-
flict, but rather to use a peace-keeping operation as a means to
alleviate the consequences of the conflict - feeding and pro-
tecting civilians, delivering humanitarian relief, and helping cre-
ate conditions conducive to promoting a peace settlement. As a
result, a large number of people are alive, housed, and safe to-
day who would have been killed, displaced, or in peril had UN-
PROFOR not been deployed.
Should UNPROFOR have jeopardized these achievements
by a greater use of coercive force? Such a question points to a
central dilemma in those situations where the United Nations
deploys peace-keepers when there is no peace to keep. Imparti-
ality is the oxygen of peace-keeping: the only way peace-keepers
can work is by being trusted by both sides, being clear and trans-
parent in their dealings, and by keeping lines of communication
15. United Nations Operation in Somalia ("UNOSOM"), S.C. Res. 751, 47th Sess.,
3069th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (1992).
16. United Nations Protection Force ("UNPROFOR"), S.C. Res. 743, 47th Sess.,
3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
17. See War in the Gulf: The Overview - U.S. and Allies Open Air War on Iraq; Bomb
Baghdad and Kuwaiti Targets; 'No Choice'But Force, Bush Declares, N.Y. TiME,Jan. 17, 1991,
at Al. Operation Desert Storm was the code name given to the U.S. military operation
in Iraq in the 1991 U.S.-Iraqi war. The U.S., in conjunction with its allies, launched the
operation to enforce the mandates of U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, which au-
thorized the use of force against Iraq after Jan. 15, 1991. Id.
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open. The moment they lose this trust, the moment they are
seen by one side as the "enemy," they become part of the prob-
lem they were sent to solve. This assumption is reflected in UN-
PROFOR's pattern of deployment in a variety of dispersed loca-
tions, loosely configured across all the battle lines, full of un-
armed or lightly armed observers and relief workers, and
travelling in highly-visible white-painted vehicles. For such a vul-
nerable force to take sides through the use of force might have
been morally gratifying - at least briefly - but it would also
have been militarily irresponsible. Ironically, the exercise of the
bombing option was made possible by UNPROFOR's inability to
hold on to Srebrenica and Zepa or to find troop contributors for
Gorazde, which reduced the United Nations' dependence on
Serb cooperation and vulnerability to Serb retaliation.. Further-
more, no single Security Council resolution on Bosnia can be
read in isolation from the others. Even in those resolutions that
allowed for the use of force,"8 the Security Council reaffirmed its
previous resolutions on UNPROFOR; in other words, it did not
want UNPROFOR to abandon its existing mandates in order to
undertake new ones. UNPROFOR thus had the difficult chal-
lenge of reconciling its authority to use force with its obligation
to perform all the other tasks mandated by the Security Council
- tasks that require the co-operation of, and deployment
amongst, all parties to the conflict. The purpose of any U.N.
peace-keeping deployment is, in the last analysis, to help extin-
guish the flames of war, not to fan them.
Peace-keepers, by definition and practice, cannot impose
their will on those who do not wish to keep the peace. Certainly
none of us would want bullies or aggressors to enjoy a de facto
veto over international efforts to help their victims; but, as the
Secretary-General has also pointed out, there is also an ethical
problem with the idea that peace should be imposed on the re-
calcitrant. Should the United Nations be devoting its efforts, ex-
pending political support and scarce finances, "in a country
where the parties actually do not deserve the assistance of the
United Nations because peace and political will do not exist?"19
The conditions imposed by the Security Council on the deploy-
18. See S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 3228th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/836 (1993); S.C.
Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 3241th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/844 (1993).
19. Vienna Seminar Speech, supra note 12, at 5.
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ment of U.N. peace-keeping troops in Angola under UNAVEM-
III, and in particular the requirement that both parties show a
tangible commitment to peace 'and take concrete steps toward
honoring their undertakings before the U.N. operation is fully
deployed, suggests that the international community has learned
this lesson.
What lies behind this approach is, of course, the acceptance
of the reality that peace-keepers have been sent precisely be-
cause the world is unable or unwilling to pursue the alternative
course: going to war. It is sometimes argued that the peace-
keeping deployment in Bosnia reflected not so much a policy as
the absence of policy; that peace-keeping responds to the need
to "do something" when policy-makers are not prepared to ex-
pend the political, military, and financial resources required to
achieve the outcome that the press and opinion-leaders are
clamoring for. Whatever the merits of this analysis, it is true that
there has been a gap between the overall thrust of international
intervention in the crisis and the actual mandates and means
given to the peace-keepers in the field. If the objective of the
international community is the firm and secure establishment of
a viable sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as many Se-
curity Council resolutions imply, then peace-keeping is not a di-
rect means to that end; rather, it is a means of containing the
situation while others - diplomats and negotiators - pursue
that end. All too often, however, the end objectives of Security
Council resolutions have been framed in terms that would re-
quire war to fulfill them, while the world has clearly committed
neither the political will nor the resources to conduct warfare for
those ends.
This was especially, but by no means solely, the case on the
question of the "safe areas." The Security Council resolutions
establishing the "safe areas" required the parties to treat them as
"safe;" 0 imposed no obligations on their inhabitants and de-
fenders; deployed U.N. troops in them but expected their mere
presence to "deter attacks;" and carefully avoided asking the
peace-keepers to "defend" or "protect" these areas, but author-
ized them to call in air power "in self-defence." This was a mas-
terpiece of diplomatic drafting but largely unimplementable as
20. Resolutions establishing safe areas include 1993 Security Council Resolutions
824, 836, and 844.
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an operational directive. As it became increasingly clear that
only force could meaningfully protect territory in the midst of
an ongoing war, the U.N. peace-keepers found themselves in the
untenable position of having to call in air strikes on the very peo-
ple amongst whom they were deployed and on whose co-opera-
tion they were dependent for their daily survival. The safe areas
and the people inside them, including U.N. peace-keepers,
could only be fed, supplied, and maintained through Serb terri-
tory and with Serb consent. Yet, while UNPROFOR was at its
most vulnerable, the world clamored for the United Nations to
attack the Serbs for every transgression, a course of action that
could have ended the co-operation without which the safe areas
could not be maintained. The peace-keepers on the ground
knew well that it is extremely difficult to make war and peace
with the same people on the same territory at the same time.
What, then, does "peace-enforcement" really mean? It
strikes me more and more as a term used to cover the desire to
go to war without making the hard political and military choices
that war requires. The real alternatives are intervention and
non-intervention; and that is a genuine choice, for many have
argued persuasively that the world's intervention in the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia has only served to prolong human suf-
fering by postponing a swift military victory for any side - in
Edward Luttwak's words, the peacekeeping operation has
amounted to "torturing" the people "with useless therapies while
denying them the decisive surgery of war."2 1
But if the world must intervene in a conflict, then the sec-
ond choice lies between the logic of peace and the logic of war.
If one chooses the former, one opts for peace-keeping, with all
its limitations: the requirement for consent and co-operation,
the indispensability of impartiality, and a sensible reluctance to
use force. One advocating this position abjures victories, dis-
claims enemies, and treats all the parties as partners in a com-
mon endeavor to attain peace. If one opts for war, one commits
the necessary political will and the military and financial re-
21. Edward N. Luttwak, Meddling By Outside Powers Has Prolonged the Balkan War,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 11, 1995, at 6. SeeJohn F. Hillen III, Killing with Kindness: The
US Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia, FOREIGN POL'Y BRIEFING 34 (Cato Inst., Washington
D.C.), June 30, 1995 (arguing that peace-keeping in Bosnia has done people more
harm than good).
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sources required to obtain victory. One identifies an enemy and
devotes the means required to destroy him.
Mixing peace-enforcement with peace-keeping is the mili-
tary equivalent of having your cake and eating it too; of staying
above the fray but entering it at moments and in areas of one's
own choosing. Peace-keepers in conflict situations are like refer-
ees in a sporting clash. But a referee who intervenes in the
match when it suits him rapidly loses the trust of the players he is
refereeing and, in the process, becomes an adversary. At that
point, does he say that he no longer wishes to be either referee
or participant, as the United Nations did in Somalia, or does he
enter the fray he sought for so long to stay out of? Peace-enforc-
ers are obliged to remain referees while threatening to become
combatants - no easy task when those on the ground do not
have the capacity to go to war, should that become unavoidable.
The dangerous risk inherent in peace-enforcement is the
gamble that one can drop bombs from the air and at the same
time negotiate co-operation on the ground with the same party.
The salience of air strikes in much of the current advocacy of
peace-enforcement is no accident: air power, as Eliot Cohen
memorably put it, "is an unusually seductive form of military
strength because, like modem courtship, it appears to offer grat-
ification without commitment."2 2 In war, air power is harnessed
to the efforts of the ground troops pursuing the same military
objective; in the inchoate world of peace-enforcement, air power
administers lessons that ground troops are neither mandated
nor equipped to teach, and if the lessons are not properly
learned, the pilots fly away while the ground troops wake up to
face the consequences the morning after. Peace-enforcement in
these conditions is an extraordinarily high-risk strategy, though
one that, as these words are written, the author hopes will work
in Bosnia. 23
At the same time, it is essential to find alternatives to war
when traditional peace-keeping is not appropriate. Dipl6macy is
the first alternative. The United Nations is redoubling its efforts
to forestall conflicts before they erupt. Early warning and pre-
22. Eliot Cohen, The Mystique of U.S. Air Power, FOREIGN AFF.,Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 109.
23. As this essay goes to press, the successful conclusion of the peace conference in
Dayton, Ohio - made possible in no small measure by the air strikes of September
1995 - appears to bear out this hope.
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ventive diplomacy are activities with a mixed track record. It is
fair to say that no one hears of the wars that did not occur be-
cause the United Nations was able to head them off, but it is also
true that early warning is of little use in and of itself, unless it is
accompanied by the political will to act on the warnings re-
ceived. 24 Any international intervention to prevent a conflict
would have to be credible; in other words, the governments de-
claring their determination not to permit another genocidal civil
war would have to be prepared to back up their statements of
resolve with action if the parties on the ground decided to ig-
nore them. This implies that effective preventive action requires
the same degree of political commitment and agreement as post-
conflict peace-keeping. Sadly, governments reluctant to send in
troops after a conflict has broken out are usually also reluctant
to do the same before the conflict begins. There is no doubt,
however, that preventive deployment would be cheaper in lives
and resources than anything that might follow.
The one current functioning example of preventive deploy-
ment, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force25 ("UN-
PREDEP") (formerly UNPROFOR) in the Former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia ("FYROM"), has contributed immensely to
the stability of the Government and the State of FYROM. But
the catch with any preventive deployment is that it is impossible
to prove a negative: any such force is a success only until it fails.
Preventive deployment may not always, or indefinitely, deter
conflict, but there is no doubt that at the very least it raises the
political price of any aggression and increases the international
community's stake in a peaceful outcome for any conflict that
may occur in its area of operations.
If conflict does occur, despite the best efforts of the diplo-
mats and peace-makers, it is vital that it be immediately ad-
dressed. The future of U.N. peace-keeping demands a rapid re-
sponse capacity; the Secretariat is largely agnostic as to how it
should acquire this. At the moment, the only tool available to it
in this domain, the Stand-By Forces Arrangement 6 ("Arrange-
24. There has been no shortage of early warnings on Burundi and indefatigable
efforts by the U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, but the limits on the ex-
tent of preventive action that governments are prepared to undertake are clear.
25. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force ("UNPREDEP"), S.C. Res. 983,
50th Sess., 3512th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/983 (1995).
26. Under the Arrangement, Member States earmark the forces and equipment
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ment"), has yet to prove itself. In the dreadful summer of 1994,
when the United Nations needed 5500 soldiers for Rwanda, it
turned to the nineteen governments that, at that time, had
pledged a total of 31,000 troops for future U.N. peace-keeping
operations; all declined to participate. The Arrangement thus
turned out to be no more than -an opportunity to obtain nega-
tive answers more rapidly than in the past, rather than generat-
ing forces more rapidly than in the past. Currently, the number
of countries enrolled in the scheme has gone up to forty. It is
not yet clear whether this implies a parallel increase in the viabil-
ity of the Arrangement.
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has, in his Agenda for
Peace27 and in subsequent declarations, suggested the establish-
ment of a rapid deployment force to serve as the Security Coun-
cil's strategic reserve whenever emergency situations require
peace-keepers to be deployed at short notice. In his Supplement
to An Agenda for Peace, 8 the Secretary-General proposed that bat-
talion-sized units be earmarked by a number of countries for this
purpose, be trained to the same standards, use identical operat-
ing procedures, share common communications and other es-
sential equipment, and train together in regular joint exercises.
They would remain within their national armies and be sta-
tioned in their home countries, but be maintained at a high state
of readiness to be deployed as soon as the need arose. The idea
has, so far, not found favor with Member States and it suffers
from the same disadvantage as the current, looser Stand-By
Forces Arrangement, i.e., that of requiring a specific decision
each time by the offering Member State as to whether the unit it
has pledged will in fact participate in the proposed operation.
An efficiently-integrated rapid deployment force would be more
vulnerable to disruption by the withdrawal of one of its crucial
elements than would be an ad hoc force drawn, as at present, by
they would in principle be prepared to provide for a U.N. peace-keeping operation.
There is, however, no binding obligation to honor pledges made and Governments
retain the right to confirm or refuse an actual contribution each time a specific opera-
tion is established.
27. Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretay-General, U.N. Docs. A/47/277 and S/
24111 (1992).
28. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretay-General, at 11, 44, U.N.
Doc. S/1995/1/A/50/60 (1995).
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the United Nations from a motley collection of volunteering gov-
ernments.
A somewhat more ambitious idea that has gained currency
in recent years is that of a permanent U.N. force - a "standing
army" or "U.N. legion" - consisting of individuals recruited,
paid, and managed by the United Nations as a sort of military
counterpart to the international civil service. The principal ad-
vantage of this idea is that such a force could immediately be
deployed upon the Security Council's authorization and it would
not require further governmental decisions, since the soldiers
would belong to the United Nations, not to the soldiers' national
armies. The principal disadvantages, however, relate to cost, size
limitations (how many "legionnaires" would one need to main-
tain effective rotations? What would happen if a new crisis
found the available forces already deployed in an earlier one?),
and the political unreadiness of certain Member States to con-
template the existence of what could be seen as a supranational
military entity under the command of the Secretary-General.
Whichever solution governments eventually agree upon, it
is clear that if the world wants the United Nations to serve, even
occasionally, as a fire brigade, it will have to establish a better
system. Under the present one, the fire breaks out, the alder-
men on the Security Council agree it needs to be put out, and
the fire chief is then sent out to hire firemen, rent fire trucks,
find hoses of the right length, and look for sources of water to
put into them - while hoping that, when he has what he needs,
the house has not already burned down and there are still survi-
vors to rescue.
But in all that it is asked to do, the United Nations can only
be as good as it is allowed to be. We are developing the capacity
to plan, mount, support, and manage peace-keeping operations
better than ever before and to combine the "gifted amateurism"
and inventive idealism of the traditional days of peace-keeping
with the technological sophistication, modem communications
and logistics, and planning skills and response capacity of the
military professionals. But we cannot do this without surmount-
ing the endemic problem of the enormous gap between man-
dates and means. As we learned in Rwanda, in 1994, and in the
Bosnian "safe areas," in 1993, the Security Council can routinely
pass resolutions without being obliged to provide the troops to
implement them. When the troops are found, they too often
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must be equipped, usually with unfamiliar equipment, and
trained, tasks for which the United Nations has no infrastructure
and which it conducts by improvisation. Furthermore, when
troops are finally found, equipped, and deployed, their govern-
ments have to be paid, an obligation in which the United Na-
tions is increasingly falling behind. Currently, the Secretary-
General has been obliged by a severe shortage of cash to sus-
pend all repayments to troop- and equipment-contributing
countries.
The General Assembly routinely exhorts Member States to
pay their assessed contributions for peace-keeping operations
"on time and in full," but in practice only a handful of Members
send in their contributions within the stipulated thirty days after
the issuance of a letter of assessment. This letter itself comes at
the end of a lengthy process of budget preparation and review by
two different governmental bodies, followed by a vote by the
General Assembly. Recent experience has been that, three
months after assessments are levied, barely fifty percent of the
required funds have been received. This shortfall ties the opera-
tional hands of the United Nations - which frequently has to
deal with commercial contractors (and in some cases govern-
ment providers) who want cash "up front" before providing
goods and services to peace-keeping operations. Equally troub-
ling, this problem limits the ability of the Secretariat to reim-
burse troop-contributing countries. In the case of developing
countries, this can cause serious hardship, particularly since gov-
ernments with hard-currency problems tend to await U.N. reim-
bursement before paying their troops. The resulting problems
of morale in missions like UNPROFOR, where soldiers subsisting
on the U.N. daily allowance of US$1.25 a day serve side-by-side
with Western troops earning hardship bonuses in addition to
their much higher regular salaries, have contributed to serious
operational difficulties on the ground. Even more discouraging
are the recent developments in the U.S. Congress, which has al-
ready mandated a unilateral reduction of the U.S. peace-keeping
contribution from 31.4% to 25% and is now considering legisla-
tion that would "offset" the costs of national military efforts
against U.N. dues. If this proposal becomes law, it would elimi-
nate, for all practical purposes, U.S. financial support for U.N.
peace-keeping.
The problem is all the more ironic when seen against the
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comparative costs of other military activities - two days of "Op-
eration Desert Storm," for instance, would have paid for all of
the U.N. peace-keeping operations that calendar year (1991) -
and even against the kinds of military expenditures national gov-
ernments are usually willing to contemplate out of their defence
budgets. An instructive indication of this came in 1993, when
NATO planners, asked to prepare for a possible operation to im-
plement a peace settlement in Bosnia, estimated its annual cost
at US$8.3 billion - by ironic coincidence the exact figure, at
that point, of the United Nations' cumulative expenditure on all
peace-keeping operations since 1948. If peace-keeping is to have
a future, governments will have to overcome the syndrome
under which legislators are always willing to pay for war, but not
for peace.
CONCLUSION
Peace-keeping today is, therefore, in flux, if not in crisis. If
it is to serve as a useful instrument in the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, it needs conceptual clarity, political
support, and financial resources. Peace-keeping has served the
world well; peace-keepers can point to a Nobel Peace Prize to
prove it. For peace-keeping to remain effective in a changing
world, its credibility must not be jeopardized by the application
of peace-keeping to inappropriate situations, by the issuance of
mandates unsupported by doctrinal consistency or military
means, or by the undermining of its authority by attempts to rec-
oncile peace-keeping with war-making under the rubric of
peace-enforcement. Perhaps, as the whirling currents of the
confused present subside, the day will come when we can stop
talking about the "changing face of peace-keeping" and survey
instead, with satisfaction, an instrument whose capacity and limi-
tations are understood by all - and are clearly seen in a face
that has stopped changing.
